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Florida courts have developed a two-part test to determine whether a homeowner may
receive the benefit of the homestead exemption. 7 Homeowners seeking to qualify must meet both
an objective and subjective test. The objective test provides that the homeowner must actually
use and occupy the home. The subjective test provides that the homeowner must express an
actual intent to live permanently in the home.
An issue that frequently arises when the homestead exemption is litigated is whether a
foreign debtor can meet the subjective prong of the homestead exemption test. Critical to the
analysis of the subjective prong is the notion of intent. A foreign debtor can prove intent to
permanently reside in a home when he has family members residing there who are permanent
United States residents, even if he is personally not residing there. Thus, it is necessary to define
the term “family.” Although it is clear that minor children are considered family, it is less clear if
having an adult child in the home would allow the property to qualify for the exemption.
This memorandum explores under what circumstances a foreign debtor can qualify for
the Florida homestead exemption. Part I examines Florida’s homestead law generally and the
legal standards courts use to determine eligibility. Part II focuses on the disagreement among the
courts regarding whether a foreign debtor can qualify for the exemption and analyzes whether
adult children are considered “family” for purposes of qualifying for the homestead exemption.
I.

The Standards for Determining Eligibility for Homestead Exemption

The homestead exemption should be “liberally construed in the interest of protecting the
family home.”8 However, courts have cautioned not to construe the exemption so liberally as to
make it an instrument of fraud or an imposition on creditors. 9 The burden of proof is on the
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objecting party to make a strong claim that the debtor is not entitled to the claimed homestead.10
A debtor loses his constitutional exemption if the claim falls into one of the three enumerated
exceptions: “(1) the payment of taxes and assessments thereon; (2) obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof; or (3) obligations contracted for house, field or other
labor performed on the reality.”11 Exceptions to the homestead exemption are strictly
construed.12
A homestead is established “where the owner of property manifests the intention to occupy
the property as a home and does not otherwise act inconstantly with that intent.” 13 Homeowners
seeking to qualify for the homestead exemption must meet both an objective and subjective
test.14 The objective test is satisfied if the owner actually uses and occupies the home.15
However, continuous uninterrupted presence is not required and preparation for immediate
occupancy may be sufficient to establish actual use. 16 The subjective test is satisfied if the
homeowner expresses an actual intent to live permanently in the home.17
Although there is no specific occupancy period required to qualify for the homestead
exemption, courts have typically held that vacation homes are not considered homesteads for the
purpose of the exemption, as vacation homes do not comport with the primary purpose of the
homestead exemption, which is assisting the debtor “in keeping a roof over his head” and
preserving a debtor’s access to property that is “essential to life and livelihood.” 18
II.

Florida’s Application of the Homestead Exemption to Foreign Debtors
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Florida courts disagree on whether foreign debtors can claim the homestead exemption under
Florida law. Specifically, courts disagree on whether foreign debtors can meet the subjective
prong of the two-part test.19
A. Foreign debtors cannot form a subjective intent to live in the U.S. forever
Some courts have found that foreign debtors cannot meet the subjective prong of the
homestead exemption because they cannot permanently live in the U.S. unless they have
obtained a permanent visa or “green card” as of the of the bankruptcy petition date.20 Due to their
temporary legal status, foreign debtors cannot form the requisite subjective intent to live in their
home permanently.21 In In re Fodor, the Bankruptcy court held that to qualify for the Florida
homestead exemption, a debtor must be a permanent resident of the state and intend to make the
property his permanent residence. 22 The debtor in Fodor was unable to satisfy the residency
requirement, as his application for permanent resident status was pending when he filed his
bankruptcy petition.23
Similarly, a tourist who does not hold a permanent visa cannot be a lawful permanent
resident of the state and is therefore incapable of declaring a home in the state as his permanent
residence.24 A citizen and former resident of a foreign country who is in the United States merely
through a temporary visa has no assurance that he can continue to reside in good faith for any
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fixed period in this country.25 Therefore, the foreign debtor cannot declare a permanent
residence, as he does not have the legal ability to determine his future status for himself. 26
Due to a foreign debtor’s lack of permanent residency in the United States, these courts have
held that the debtor is incapable of having the requisite intent to live permanently in their home
and is therefore unable to qualify for the Florida homestead exemption.
B. The subjective prong may be satisfied by family members residing in the home

Other courts have extended the right to claim Florida’s homestead exemption when the
foreign debtor has family members residing at the claimed homestead who have permanent
residency in the United States.27
For the debtor to formulate an actual subjective intent to permanently reside in his or her
home, “at least one family member living in the home must demonstrate sufficient credible
attempts to gain legal status as a permanent resident in the United States.” 28 A formal legal
request for permanent residency is required. 29 In In re De Bauer, although the debtor was not
herself a permanent resident of the United States, she was able to claim the Florida homestead
exemption by relying on the residency status of her adult daughter and son-in-law, who both
resided with her.30 The debtor’s daughter demonstrated credible attempts to gain permanent
residency by both enrolling in the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program
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and applying for a “green card.”31 Thus, the debtor’s daughter could satisfy the subjective prong
for the exemption on the debtor’s behalf. 32
C. Discord on whether adult children qualify as family to satisfy the subjective prong

For foreign debtors, determining what individuals constitute as “family” is crucial, as these
family members are the vehicle to form the requisite intent the debtor needs to qualify for the
subjective prong of the homestead exemption. There is disagreement among the courts on
whether the homestead’s protection of a family residence extends to property occupied by the
owner and her adult child, as opposed to only permitting protection when the child is a minor.
The definition of family arises in the context of the subjective prong of the homestead exemption
test because the requisite intent to make the home a permanent residence may be satisfied if the
homeowner intended to make his property his family’s permanent residence.33
i.

Test for family

For purposes of the homestead exemption, the test for family is: (1) a legal duty to maintain
arising out of the relationship and (2) a continuing communal living by at least two individuals
under circumstances where one is regarded as the person in charge.34 The first prong of the test is
referred to as “family in law,” while the second prong is considered “family in fact.” 35 Under this
test, the “head of the family must not only be obligated to support his family by law, but also
must actually support such dependents.”36
ii.

The minority view refuses to recognize adult children as family
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While recognizing that the homestead exemption protects property occupied by the owner’s
family, some courts have refused to recognize adult children as family.37 The rationale is that a
parent’s legal duty to support a child ends when the child reaches the age of majority unless the
child is physically or mentally disabled. 38 Because the legal duty to support ends when the child
reaches the age of majority, “family in law,” the first prong of the test, is not met. 39 In In re
Fowler, the debtor claimed as homestead two adjoining parcels, one occupied by her and the
other by her adult daughter.40 The court refused to extend the homestead exemption to the
daughter’s parcel and only permitted the exemption of the parcel the debtor herself lived in. 41
The court reasoned that although the homestead exemption should be construed liberally, the
exemption is still limited to the residence of the owner or the owner’s family. 42 Because the
daughter was an adult and the debtor had no legal duty to support her, she could not be
considered family for purposes of the exemption. 43
iii.

The majority of courts consider adult children to be family

Other courts have read the test for family as disjunctive, holding that the test can be met
either singularly or in combination. 44 Under this standard, even if there is no legal duty to
support the child because the child reached the age of majority (“family in law”), the court may
still find continuing communal living by at least two individuals under circumstances where one
is regarded as the person in charge (“family in fact”). 45 “Family in fact” arises out of a moral,
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rather than legal, duty to support. 46 The Oyola court recognized that reading the test in the
disjunctive is consistent with how Florida courts have since treated the homestead exemption, as
numerous Florida courts have explained that the Florida homestead law recognizes both “family
in law” and “family in fact.”47
For example, in In re Oyola, although there was no “family in law” because the foreign
debtor’s daughter had reached the age of majority, the court concluded that there was a “family
in fact,” as the debtor was living with her adult daughter and minor granddaughter and both the
daughter and granddaughter recognized the debtor as the person in charge. 48 Therefore, even
though the debtor herself was not a permanent resident of the United States and could not legally
intend to reside here permanently, she was able to satisfy the requisite intent of the subjective
prong due to the formation of a “family in fact.”
Conclusion
There is disagreement among Florida courts on whether a foreign debtor may claim the
protection of the homestead exemption. Courts that have held that a foreign debtor cannot claim
the exemption have done so on the grounds that foreign debtors, due to their lack of permanent
residency, cannot formulate the requisite intent to reside in the United States indefinitely.
However, there is a recent trend toward extending the exemption to foreign debtors, relying on
the residency status of the debtor’s family living in the home. With respect to the disagreement
over whether adult children should be recognized as family for homestead purposes, the majority
of the case law points to adult children being recognized. In the last ten years, all but two courts
have extended the homestead exemption to property occupied by a debtor’s adult child.
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